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Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of ‘technicity’, a
term borrowed from philosophy but recast in an
Darwinian mould. Firstly, however, the presumption
that language is THE unique and pre-eminent
human trait is put to the adaptationist test. Evidence
from palaeontology, primate studies and
evolutionary psychology is brought together to
(tentatively) suggest that language (speech) has a
deep evolutionary past and that all members of the
genus Homo possessed speech in some form. The
second section marshals evidence that suggests our
species possesses a new ‘making things’
adaptation. This adaptation appears to be the basis
for the speciation event that defines behaviourally
modern humans: our species. This is the capability
for which the term ‘technicity’ is appropriated. The
argument for splitting off language from technicity
uses the concept of the extended phenotype.
Technicity might best be characterised by a creative
capacity to:
a) deconstruct and reconstruct nature, and 
b) communicate by drawing. 
The notion is floated that the newly evolved
adaptation discretely insinuated itself into extant
human culture; followed by brief consideration of the
role of drawing, in the form of writing, on the
precision and power of linguistic expression. It is
suggested that technicity might usefully be
considered the source of our intellect and language
its whetstone. If further studies support the technicity
hypothesis then reappraisal of conceptual
framework underpinning the educational curriculum
might be of benefit: a technology of language rather
than the language of technology. 
Key words: technicity, evolution, language, drawing,
intellect, creativity.
Definition
Let me start by defining technicity. The French use it
for a character of a product or person, a Gallic hi-
tech with quality, precision, professionalism. My
usage is based on the translation by Hubert Dreyfus
(2002) of Martin Heidegger’s der Technik (Krell
1993:Ch VII), whence: ‘technicity’, the attempt of
modern man to dominate the earth by controlling
beings that are considered as objects
(Encyclopaedia Britannica 2000). 
Introduction
I make no apology for borrowing a term from
philosophy and bending it to my purpose. Design
and technology, unlike traditional academic fields,
seems to lack an intellectual core: it’s all about
making things. For rather longer than I care to think,
this has concerned me. Our technical capability has
transformed our planet and ourselves, and
continues to do so. On an evolutionary timescale
these changes have happened instantaneously.
Developed over the past two decades, the field now
called ‘evolutionary psychology,’ offers interesting
insights into how we came to be. Unfortunately,
neither this new field (Barrett et al: 2002), nor its
academic precursors (such as Eysenck: 2000), has
anything to say about how we are able make things.
Look up how we perceive the world, and there is a
plethora of research findings. Ask how we draw, say,
a triangle and there is silence. At most we have a
chronology of drawing development in children
(Cox:1992). In this paper I hope to do two things: 
1) Tease out and clarify ‘language’ as an
evolutionary adaptation.
2) Draw out the core of modern human behaviour:
our ability to create and innovate. 
Thereafter I open a discussion of the
technicity/language question. My apologies for the
paucity of reference here, but as Dunbar (2003)
confirms, these library shelves are rather bare.
Language
A biological adaptation for spoken communication
The accepted view
In education, English is the Queen of subjects. The
National Curriculum, heralded by Kingman
(DES:1988) and now enshrined in Handbook 2000
(DfEE/QCA:1999), places English at its head and
heart. Philosophers assert that descriptive and
discursive language is unique to our species, and
agree that it is our very highest cognitive capability:
Philosopher Dennett (1996:171): we are the most
intelligent of all species, ‘We are also the only
species with language’; Linguist Pinker (2003:207):
it is our pre-eminent, awe-inspiring trait; Biologist
Diamond (1992:125): without language we could not
have built Chartres Cathedral; Science writer Tudge
(1995:2): the ability to pool our thoughts through
speech puts us qualitatively into a different league
from all other species. Dawkins’ (1989:Ch11,
Blackmore 2000) ‘meme’ embodies this accepted
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view. Jones (1994) writes of the ‘language of genes’.
Computerists have programming language, and
Logo Turtle Talk (Papert 1980:Ch4). Language is
pervasive and powerful, see Chang (1993:295) on
the rhetoric of Mao. But in what manner was it a
successful evolutionary adaptation?
An evolutionary chronology
Chomsky (cited Pinker 1994:389) rejected the idea
that ‘such systems as language’ might be a product
of natural selection. However, complexity and power
are no counterarguments to natural selection: the
eye is the standard refutation. Unlike tools and teeth,
speech leaves no archaeological record. Hence
chronologies vary. There is a view, supported by
linguistic and genetic analysis (Cavalli-Sforza: 2001),
that speech emerged when we did as a species
some 100Ka years ago. Deacon (1998), however,
argues persuasively for the co-evolution of language
and the human brain over the whole 5Ma of
hominine evolution. Dunbar (Barrett et al: 2002) opts
for language, in the modern sense, being established
half a million years ago concurrently with the
appearance of anatomically modern humans. So, the
answer to ‘When?’ appears to be: ‘Before us.’ But for
what is language a successful adaptation? 
The character of the adaptation
Primate studies, from Goodall (1986) to the present
(Boesh et al: 2002) complement the data from
palaeontology. Goodall’s (1986) observation that
much human behaviour, from cultural tool use to
tribal warfare; from display to alliance forming; from
gender grouping to consortship mirrors that of
chimpanzees, is increasingly confirmed. The
controversy (Pinker 1995; Jahme 2001) over ape,
bonobo in particular, language-capability misses the
point: primates have complex social communication
skills. Dunbar (1996) proposed that language is an
organ of social cohesion that evolved from
behaviour similar to chimpanzee grooming. 
Dunbar’s hypothesis is rooted in the observation
that humans are a uniquely cooperative species,
which poses a significant problem in evolutionary
theory. A given of genetics, (Dawkins 1989, 1988)
is that altruism is only adaptive if sacrifice benefits
genes held in common, i.e. by close kin. The
reason for this rule is that within a population of co-
operators who mutually reciprocate, a freerider,
non-reciprocator, will gain more resources and
thereby reproductive advantage. A population of
co-operators is rapidly driven to extinction after the
introduction of a few freeriders. If, however, you
allow the co-operators a memory, so they can
recall who scratched their back and who didn’t, a
tit-for-tat algorithm enables the co-operators to
prosper and the system settles down into an
evolutionary stable state. The stable state is a mix
of co-operators and freeriders. Evolutionary
psychology (Barkow et al 1992; Pinker 1999;
Evans & Zarate 1999) gives us a good idea of how
and why cooperation is adaptive and of the
evolution of defences against freeriders. The key
organ for both is language (speech) and a good
memory: and there appears to have been an
evolutionary arms race. Dunbar correlated this with
increased encephalization, cf. Deacon’s (1998) co-
evolution hypothesis. But Dunbar associates
language with gossip, not intelligence. The co-
operator/freerider warfare that drove the speech
adaptation also includes sexual selection and
competition and the provisioning requirements of
females with increasingly immature, large brained
neonates. Our ‘theory of mind’ (intentionality),
devastatingly absent in autistic people, makes
discursive conversation possible: ‘I think that she
thinks that he thinks that I think, etc.’. Description
requires shared memories, as the grammatically
and semantically correct but pragmatically
defective speech of Williams syndrome sufferers
demonstrates. One very telling characteristic of
speech (language) is the correlation of linguistic
diversity with natural resources (Nettle 1999).
Diamond (1998) describes how a single language
diverged into 600 mutually incomprehensible
languages in New Guinea. Such instability of
sound and grammar appears to be an unnecessary
cost, so what might be the adaptive advantage?
The co-operator/freerider conflict that besets our
species provides an explanation. Evolutionary
adaptation has built mechanisms into language
both for freerider detection and community
cohesion: phonetic drift is quite systematic and the
sound system in static societies (accent) changes
within as little as fifteen kilometres. Likewise
vocabulary (dialect): the slang of gangs, specialist
terms, and intergenerational shift serves a similar
function. Freerider/co-operator conflict is sufficient,
in my view, to account for the grammatical and
semantic complexity of language. Speech is a
biological adaptation that enables humans with
memories-in-common to gossip.
Phenotype relationship
Clarity about the relationship of language to the
human phenotype is important. Spoken, or gestural,
language has no need of external aid. The memory
is in the mind and speech and hearing are biological
functions. Language is an organ, like the eye. There
is nothing in the character or evolutionary trajectory
of language that can lead to the conclusion that
language per se is the cause of our ability to dress
or make a scooter for the child, or build Chartres
Cathedral, or create at all. 
2
3DATA International Research Conference 2004 
Creativity and Innovation
Technicity
The process by which modern man controls things
by considering them as objects
Tool making and the extended phenotype
We have confused ourselves considerably by
presuming that tools made and used by animals,
from chimpanzee termite sticks to H erectus’ finely
crafted bifacial ‘handaxes’, are tools in the modern
sense. Dawkins (1999) concept of the ‘extended
phenotype’ is helpful in clarifying matters: certain
animal tool-oriented behaviours are an external
extension of the organism. Sticklebacks and birds’
nests fit this category. The extended phenotype is a
genetically determined species-specific pattern. The
handaxe of H erectus fits the criterion. Unlike
learned behaviour, such as chimpanzee nut
cracking, no cultural transmission is involved, only
the conditions for emergence.
The emergence of technicity
No species, present or past, Homo or otherwise,
other than ourselves is creative or innovative. In
Europe some 50Ka ago, the Neanderthals co-
existed with the Cro-Magnons; the former
anatomically modern humans, the latter
behaviourally moderns (Leakey 1994; Lewin 1998).
In their period of European co-existence
Neanderthals picked up some Cro-Magnon
innovations, no doubt by cultural transmission,
possibly involving speech. Elsewhere, the
Neanderthal stone tool assemblage, like that of H
erectus and H habilis, remained essentially
unchanged for 300 millennia. That is, the
Neanderthals, with brains 150ml larger than ours,
were uncreative. Hence, language alone appears
insufficient – although the neurological information
storage systems underpinning speech might be
necessary – for the development of creativity. 
We know little of the evolutionary trajectory of
technicity, but a recent review by McBrearty and
Brooks (2000) traces hesitant beginnings for
technology back to about a half a million years ago.
Within the varied species Homo in Africa around this
time there were some who produced geometric
stone flakes, which suggests component-built tools;
and used ochre to colour artefacts. These peoples
appeared to have coexisted, and waxed and waned,
with other anatomically modern humans until,
around 120Ka ago, when a genetic bottleneck
(Jones 2002:61) indicates a speciation event. This
speciation appears to have been the, risky,
adaptation of technicity. I use the term risky
advisedly because a feature of technicity, creativity,
is genetically correlated with depressive and bipolar
disorders (Horrobin, 2002; Nettle 2002).
Nevertheless, technicity must have played a key
part in the radiation of our species. We arrived in
Australia, never less than a 75-kilometre sea journey
from Asia, at least 60Ka ago, so we must have been
able to build boats very early in our pre-history. 
The character of technicity
Technicity is the capacity of behaviourally modern
humans to: 
•  deconstruct and reorder objects; and 
•  deploy an external memory system. 
Deconstruction and construction.
We can pluck a piece of grass and weave it around
itself to make a ring. We can form the same shape
from clay either by pushing our thumb through or by
rolling a sausage and joining the ends. Not only can
we conceptualise an entity that does not exist in
nature, our musculature can produce it from varied
materials in a multiplicity of ways. And, it seems, we
have no clue as to how the trick is worked.
Imagination, the rehearsing of alternative scenarios,
resonates with the Machiavellian intelligence shown
by higher primates and the human theory of mind.
But this is interpersonal imagination not an
imagination that can deconstruct and reorder the
physical world. There is a widely held presumption
(see 1.1 above) that a mind arranged to store and
evaluate subtle nuances of personality and alliance
in a network of around 150 resource-sharing
community members would contain the data and
processing necessary for imagining a different
physical world. But is the capacity to deceive the
same form of intelligence that is required to imagine
a paper clip unbent and re-bent to make a hook?
Surely, the concept of digging up a tuber and
replanting it somewhere more convenient for next
year is of a different order from using the
recollection in autumn of a spring flower as the
signal of a potential food source?
By what neural mechanism our species is uniquely
able to construct machines is very unclear (Arbib 1995,
Carter 2000), However, we do know a reasonable
amount about cultural transmission and the rate at
which innovations are adopted – or capability lost
(Dunbar et al 1999, Diamond 1998), the period being
about a generation. We know from engineering history
(e.g. Trevithick 1872) that innovation requires a secure
cultural foundation and that most ‘creative leaps’ are
blindingly obvious in retrospect. 
The external memory system
We may have little idea how we construct but we do
know that a part of the process involves
regurgitating some of the contents of our mind into
the environment. This we do by drawing. No chimp
can do this. Inversen and Matsuzawa (2001) failed
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to teach a language-using chimp to draw a line
between two dots. Drawing is a capability that
begins to develop in childhood around the time
speech development is complete – the respective
developmental periods being about three to ten
years and eighteen months to four years. Speech
develops much more automatically than does
drawing, which has to be taught. When we talk of
drawing, the standard trap is to think of art (Cox
199, Gregory 1998). Art is display. Writing and
shape are far more functionally constructive. 
Writing
I consider writing before shape because I want to
establish very clearly the intellectual power of
technicity. Spoken language is of the moment: ‘I am
leaving.’ ‘Who is she?’ Writing gets speech out of the
air and onto a material surface – where it can
become an object of study. But ‘speech’ misleads us.
Self-evidently a technology (Jackson,1981), writing’s
earliest appearance was in accountancy (Van de
Mieroop, 1999). Thereafter there is a classic
technology spiral, as this external memory system is
developed to serve novel applications. Symbol
systems proliferate (Coulmas,1996). Intellect is
liberated. We create concepts and things: think from
algorithm to Turing machine (Berlinski, 2000); build
the stored program digital computer (Augarten, 1985).
Shape and space
Letters are simple shapes: ‘balls and sticks’. Simple
shapes are unnatural and we find this hard to
comprehend, so we use the language of Platonic
ideals. They are also hard to draw, so we developed
technologies: the straightedge and compass.
Without these drawing tools engineering and
architecture is not possible. With them the
technology spiral led to maps, circuit boards,
skyscrapers, and motorcycles. The sole possession
of a penniless Richard Trevithick on his return from
South America was his drawing compass. Drawing
and its instruments are the means by which we
make externally available our thoughts on the thing-
in-the-world considered as object. 
Discussion
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that a
capability I call ‘technicity’ is unique to our species,
and represents our highest level of intellectual
functioning. This runs counter to the accepted view
that this role is held by language. From evolutionary
psychology, we may affirm a technology of language
and question whether there is a language of
technology. Creativity is not in language, though
creativity co-opts language. Innovation is to be
expected. Technicity is its intellectual driver. 
This analysis poses a number of questions within
and without education. Outside education, there is
the question of whether technicity is growing in the
population: if technicity is adaptive those ‘with it’
should reproduce faster than those without. Within
education, the technicity notion, if supported by
research, challenges the intellectual primacy of
language. This would place on educationalists the
burden of re-appraising language in the service of a
capability curriculum founded in technicity. 
In support of primacy of technicity over language,
may I cite Smiles (1857:482).
George Stephenson, having reluctantly accepted an
invitation to join a New Year party at Sir Robert Peel’s
place in Tamworth in 1845, argued with Dr Buckland
that ‘trains ran on bottled sunlight’ (the modern theory
of the formation of coal). But the result was, that Dr
Buckland, a much greater master of tongue-fence
than Stephenson, completely silenced him. (Cf
Stephenson’s problems with Parliament over the
Liverpool-Manchester railway.) Next morning during a
pre-breakfast stroll with with Sir William Follett,
Stephenson ‘briefed’ this eminent lawyer with his
theory. At dinner that night Peel introduced the topic
again. The result was, that in the argument that
followed, the man of science was overcome by the
man of law, and Sir William Follett had at all points
mastery over Dr Buckland.  When asked to comment,
Stephenson’s reply was: ‘there seems to me to be no
power so great as the gift of the gab.’
References
Arbib M.A. (ed) (1995), Handbook of Brain Theory
and Neural Networks,The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Augarten S (1985), An Illustrated History of
Computers, George Allen & Unwin, London.
Barkow J Cosmides L & Tooby J (1992), The
Adapted Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Berlinski D (2000), The Advent of the Algorithm,
Harcourt, New York.
Blackmore S (2000),The Meme Machine Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Boesch C Hohmann H & Marchant L F (eds) (2002),
Behavioural Diversity in Chimpanzees and Bonobos,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Carter R (2000), Mapping the Mind, Phoenix,
London. 
Cavalli-Sforza L L (2001), Genes, Peoples and
Languages, Penguin Books, London.
4
5DATA International Research Conference 2004 
Creativity and Innovation
Chang J (1993), Wild Swans, Flamingo, London.
Coulmas F (1996), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of
Writing Systems, Blackwell, Oxford.
Cox M (1992), Children’s Drawings, Penguin Books,
London.
Dawkins R (1989) (New Edn), The Selfish Gene,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Dawkins R (1998), The Blind Watchmaker, Penguin
Books, London.
Dawkins R (1999) (Rev Edn), The Extended
Phenotype, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Dennett D (1996), Darwin’s Dangerous Idea,
Penguin Books, Oxford.
Deacon T (1998), The Symbolic Species, Penguin
Books, London.
Delluc B & Delluc G (1990)(Tr Moyon A),
Discovering Lascaux, Sud-Ouest, Bordeau.
DES (The Kingman Report) (1998), Report of the
Committee of Inquiry into the Teaching of English
Language HMSO, London.
Diamond J (1992), The Rise and Fall of the Third
Chimpanzee, Vintage, London.
Diamond J (1998), Guns, Germs and Steel, Vintage,
London.
Dreyfus H (2002), Re: Technicity 17 Aug. Email to:
Mike Doyle (mikedoyle@btinternet.com)
Dunbar RMI (2003),Re: Ev Psy and Human graphic
capabilities 20 Aug. Email to: Mike Doyle
(mikedoyle@btinternet.com)
Dunbar R (1996) Gossip, Grooming and the
Evolution of Language, Faber, London.
Dunbar R Knight C & Power C (eds) (1999), The
Evolution of Culture, Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh.
Encyclopaedia Britannica [DVD] (2000), (s l):
www.britannica.co.uk
Evans D & Zarate O (1999), Evolutionary
Psychology, Icon Books, Cambridge. 
Eysenck M W (2000), Psychology: A Student’s
Handbook, Psychology Press, Hove.
Goodall J (1986), The Chimpanzees of the Gombe,
Belknap Press of the University of Harvard, London.
Gregory R L (1998), Eye and Brain 5th edn, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Horrobin D (2002), The Madness of Adam and Eve,
Corgi Books, London.
Inversen I H & Matsuzawa T (2001), ‘Establishing
Line Tracing on a touch Monitor as a Basic Drawing
Skill in Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes)’, in T
Matsuzawa (ed) (2001) Primate Origins of Human
Cognition and Behaviour, Springer Verlag, Tokyo.
Jackson D (1981), The Story of Writing, The
Calligraphy Centre, Monmouth.
Jahme C  (2001), Beauty and the Beasts, Virago,
London.
Jones M (2001), The Molecule Hunt, Penguin
Books, London.
Jones S (1994), The Language of Genes, Flamingo,
London.
Krell D F (1993), Basic Writings, Roultedge, London.
Leakey R (1994), The Origin of Humankind,
Weidenfield & Nicolson, London.
Lewin R (1998), Principles of Human Evolution,
Blackwell Scientific, Malden Mass.
Martin H-J (1995)(Tr Cochrane L G) The History and
Power of Writing Chicago University Press, Chicago.
McBrearty S & Brooks A S (2000),’The Revolution that
Wasn’t’ in Journal of Human Evolution 39, 5, 453-563.
Nettle D (1999), Linguistic Diversity, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Nettle D (2002), Strong Imagination, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Papert S (1980), Mindstorms, The Harvester Press,
Brighton.
Pinker S (1994), The Language Instinct, Penguin
Books, London.
Pinker S (1999), How the Mind Works, Penguin
Books, London.
Pinker S (2003), The Blank Slate ,Penguin Books,
London.
DATA International Research Conference 2004 
Creativity and Innovation
Robinson A (1995), The Story of Writing, Thames &
Hudson, London.
Smiles S (1857), The Life of George Stephenson,
Railway Engineer, John Murray, London.
Trevithick F (1872), Life of Richard Trevithick, Spon,
London.
Tudge C (1996), The Day Before Yesterday, Pimlico,
London.
Van de Mieroop M (1999), Cuneiform Texts and the
Writing of History, Routledge, London.
6
